Testimony given by Garry Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner of the RCMP

Highlights:


• Loeppky testified that information about innocent people who have come into contact with a target under investigation is placed in their databases and can be passed to U.S. and other foreign agencies.
  
• Loeppky said that day-to-day sharing of information with foreign agencies is not documented and need not receive any approval from a higher authority.

The following was taken from the testimony of Garry Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner of the RCMP, when questioned by commission counsel on June 30.

Loeppky’s Background

Loeppky joined the RCMP in April 1972. In Sept. 1990 he was made Inspector and in 1994 he became the Executive Officer to the Commissioner, first serving Commissioner Inkster (for only six months), then Commissioner Murray. In 1996 he became the Officer in Charge of Criminal Operations in "J" Division (New Brunswick), and in 1997 he became the Commanding Officer of the "J" Division. In October 2000 he became the Deputy Commissioner of Operations (then called the Deputy Commissioner of Organized Crime and Operational Policy).

He is a member of the Executive of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and is Co-Chair of the National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime.

He has been awarded the RCMP Long Service Medal with silver bar, the 125 Canada Anniversary Medal, the Queen's Golden Jubilee and the Order of Merit of Police Forces Officer's Medal.

Structure of the RCMP and its Services

Loeppky testified that the RCMP can hire civilians and can work outside of Canada. He said most officers exercising lawful authority in Canada are peace officers, and that the RCMP has 22,339 employees across Canada, with about 15-16,000 working in operations (Loeppky’s area). The basic duties of RCMP members are to conduct criminal investigations, prevent crime, apprehend those who break the law and preserve the peace. Loeppky said national security investigations also focus on prevention.

He said the RCMP provides contract policing services to eight provinces, the three territories and over 200 municipalities. He explained that the federal and international operations includes four key components: the border (including Customs, Immigration and federal services); organized crime and drugs; international operations and international liaison (including Interpol, liaison officers and peacekeeping personnel, as well as the international visits and travel program); and the financial crimes area.

The RCMP is headed by Commissioner Zaccardelli, who has direction and control of the RCMP under the direction of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. With its headquartered in Ottawa, the RCMP has also four regions and 15 divisions.

Loeppyk said that the relevant regions and divisions regarding Maher Arar’s case are the Central Region (headed by Deputy Commissioner René Charbonneau, who was replaced by Deputy Commissioner Pierre Lange in 2003) and the “C” Division of Quebec (headed by Assistant Commissioner Pierre Lange before he was promoted as Deputy of the Central Region), the “O” Division of Ontario (headed by Assistant Commissioner Freeman Sheppard) and the “A” division of Ottawa (headed by Assistant Commissioner Dawson Hovey).

There are eight Deputy Commissioners, four for each region and four for functional operations, but Loeppky is the only one in headquarters. Loeppky’s executive assistant is the Assistant Commissioner of Criminal Intelligence, Richard Proulx, who was there between 2001 and 2003 but recently retired.

In national security, the hierarchy flows from Loeppky to Proulx to Dan Killam, the Director General of the National Security Branch. The National Security Branch also has three branches: the National Security Intelligence Branch (NSIB), National Security Operations Branch (NSOB) and Policy Planning and Development. Loeppky said the NSIB and the NSOB bring together the parts of the RCMP and the international community that produce threat assessments, with the NSOB monitoring, reviewing, providing direction for and evaluating ongoing criminal investigations (including national security investigations). He said they also investigate terrorist financing. Superintendent Wayne Pilgrim was in charge of the NSOB under Assistant Commissioner Proulx at the relevant times to Arar’s case.

He said the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) at headquarters has 167 full-time employees, with about 60 engaged in the National Security Branch. Loeppky confirmed that in national security, in the four INSETs and the NSISs in 14 locations across Canada, there are about 290 members involved (including the 60 at headquarters). It is the responsibility of the Assistant Commissioner of the CID at headquarters to approve all investigations in sensitive sectors (trade unions, the media, religious institutions, political institutions and educational institutions).

Counsel asked if one of the problems within the RCMP that led to the creation of CID was that the RCMP was not engaging in advance knowledge of crimes and criminal intelligence strategy. Loeppky said that many things lead to the CID, including the a new policing initiative in the late 80’s/early 90’s called "Community Policing", which is meant to engage communities in problem-solving. He said this gave them a better sense of the environment, threats, issues and the nature of what they were facing. He said it also led to the concept of intelligence-led policing, which dealt with the RCMP’s failure to develop a sophisticated strategic and tactical intelligence capability to accurately prevent organized and national security related crimes and to predict future problems.

Loeppky also explained that the Security Offences Branch coordinates criminal investigations of national security, and that before 9/11 it had 21 people working there. Loeppky confirmed that the Secure Criminal Information System (SCIS), in headquarters’ Security Offences Branch, has a centralized database for the national Criminal Intelligence Program, ensuring that national security data is stored separately from the national database for criminal information. Access to the SCIS database is limited to role-based access (he also said it’s “limited to the Criminal Intelligence Program personnel at Headquarters and in the Divisions”) and is based on a need to know.

There is also the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), which has a mandate is to serve as a central point for criminal intelligence focusing on organized crime so that the Canadian police community can work together. They table an annual report at the Chiefs of Police conference about threat assessments. It currently has over 160 participating law enforcement agencies.

Impact of 9/11

Because of 9/11, 2,200 officers (1/10 of the force) were initially deployed to prevent attacks on Canada and to help with things like managing the airplanes landing in Newfoundland, giving additional protection to VIPs and assisting airport security.

Loeppky said that this wasn’t the first time the RCMP had been involved in a national security investigation, as they had dealt with several attacks on Turkish diplomats in Ottawa, the Air India case and the Ahmed Rassam (1999) bomb plot intended for an LA airport. He said the Ressam investigation was a collaboration between the RCMP, CSIS, US agencies and the international community – showing that an integrated approach can prevent such acts.

Loeppky said that 9/11 caused so much anxiety and concern of more attacks that there was a “significant amount of pressure.” He acknowledged that there were allegations in the US that the terrorists were from Canada or did their planning here.

When asked if there was a lot of pressure from the US, Loeppky replied that it “was clear that the US was relying on us to do our part” to secure North America. He explained that there were 1,500 inquiries or requests for follow-up in the months after 9/11 from the US, and that the RCMP directed its officers to answer them quickly. He said that Canada also made several hundred requests of the US as well, but that the majority of requests were the US asking Canada. He said the normal number of requests from the US was less than 50/month before 9/11, and is now about 150/month.

A backgrounder from the RCMP entitled "Post-September 11th - The Fight Against Terrorism" says the RCMP was given $59 million on Oct. 12, 2001 to fight terrorism, which Loeppky said was to help pay for overtime costs, enhancement of technology and training, and for the redeployment of the 2,200 people. The backgrounder also says the Dec. 10, 2001 federal budget gave the RCMP $576 million to fund 17 national security initiatives, which Loeppky said includes the Integrated Special Enforcement Teams (INSET) and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET).

In total, Canada spent about $7 billion to enhance national security activities.

Canada and the US also announced the Smart Border Declaration 30-point plan on Dec. 11, 2001. Loeppky said it is commonly known as the Manley-Ridge plan, and that some of its initiatives, like establishing IBETs and pre-clearance for other agencies, are in the RCMP’s mandate.

Loeppky said that the IBET program was created in B.C. before 9/11 as a way to stop cross-border drug trafficking. He said it was found to be very effective and after 9/11, it was expanded to 25 locations where IBETs work with liaisons from the US (referred to as collocation, which is done in Cornwall and Windsor), although these liaisons do not have law enforcement status. IBETs involve the RCMP, local police and the Canadian Border Services Agency (formerly Customs and Immigration).

After 9/11, they also added a Financial Intelligence Branch, and moved the INSETs into four areas. Other differences include a new Minister and a Director General of National Security.

Loeppky said agreements to share information with foreign agencies did not increase after 9/11, although case-by-case exchanges of information to assist in criminal investigations did.

Anti-Terrorism Act’s Impact on the RCMP

The RCMP Act says they have primary responsibility for proceedings related to national security threats, or if a victim is an internationally protected person.

Loeppky explained that the Act contained provisions for new crimes, such as facilitation and terrorist fundraising. However, he said it didn’t give them many new powers, except for investigative hearings and preventative arrests, both of which require approval from Loeppky (as Deputy Commissioner) and the Attorney General before they can be used. Any individual subject to these powers is entitled to a lawyer and to appear before a judge within 24 hours. The two powers are also subject to an annual report to Parliament and a five-year sunset clause (due in 2006).

Loeppky said that preventative arrests have never been used, but the investigative hearing was used once (in the Air India case, the Supreme Court recently ruled on its use).

CSIS and the RCMP

A document prepared by Philip Rosen, a Senior Analyst in the Parliamentary Research Branch, notes that illegal acts committed by the RCMP after being asked by the government to take a proactive response to the 1970 October Crisis lead to the Macdonald Commission in 1977. The commission’s report, like the Mackenzie commission’s report, recommended a separate civilian agency responsible for national security and resulted in the creation of CSIS.

Loeppkey agreed with Elcock that about 80% of the RCMP’s security service members were moved to CSIS when it was created in 1984. However, the Security Offences Act still gave the RCMP primary responsibility for criminal offences.

Counsel asked if the witness recalled that the McDonald report criticized the RCMP’s security service as having too “diffuse” and “ambiguous” a mandate, without clarifying its responsibilities. Loeppky agreed with counsel that there were “growing pains” as national security was removed from the RCMP and it’s responsibilities were made clear, but says they were quickly overcome in the new relationship. He also said that while there were criticisms from the Air India trial, such as better information sharing was needed along with different processes for retaining evidence, and that they were dealt with long ago.

Loeppky confirmed that the RCMP relies primarily on CSIS and is CSIS’ primary recipient of intelligence, even after 9/11. He said that many of their cases result from CSIS’ disclosure letters, and that the need for information sharing and integration is greater today.

Loeppky acknowledged that there is an arrangement between CSIS and the RCMP detailing the security-related responsibilities of each.

He also explained that the RCMP has 35 liaison officers in 25 places around the world. He said the liaisons also provide support to the heads of embassies, and that there is a policy ensuring that CSIS and RCMP liaisons don’t waste time completing the same work.

The RCMP and CSIS also have liaisons with each other. Loeppky said they have had liaisons in Montreal and Toronto since about 2002, and each INSET team has a CSIS officer on it.

Differences and Similarities Between CSIS and the RCMP; Elcock’s Testimony

Counsel asked if Loeppky agreed with Elcock’s assessment of police work as reactive and after the fact, whereas security intelligence work is preventative. Loeppky disagreed, saying the RCMP’s primary role is to preserve the peace and prevent crime, with criminal investigation and prosecution being a last resort.

Elcock also said that police work is results-oriented, heading towards prosecution, whereas security intelligence is a long-term open-ended kind of investigation. Loeppky generally agreed with this assessment.

Elcock also said that police work is highly decentralized, whereas security intelligence has to be centralized. Loeppky said that general police work is decentralized, as each officer must use their own judgment in each case, but that national security investigations are more centralized, such as with the (Secure Criminal Information System) database of national security information.

Loeppky generally agreed with Elcock that police work involves gathering evidence, whereas security intelligence is involved in collecting information that does not need to meet evidentiary standards.

Elcock also said that security intelligence has a great deal of political control from the Minister, whereas police work should have no political interference, and Loeppky generally agreed. He also said that there is no political direction in the RCMP’s national security responsibilities, and that they only have to meet the court’s expectations. But he said that there is some ministerial direction in arrangements with foreign agencies.

NSISs and INSETs

Loeppky described the NSIS (National Security Investigations Sections) as small sections located in the divisions that deal with the criminal aspect of national security matters. He said they have more a centralized reporting function than the division criminal analysis section, which focuses more on organized crime. He said that four (Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa) of the 14 sections that existed were subsequently converted to INSETs after 9/11.

A recent policy provision is that INSETs and NSISs will conduct anti-terrorism investigations, although they always had jurisdiction to conduct national security criminal investigations.

The INSET program received $47 million over five years from the Dec. 10, 2001 federal budget.

INSETs are designed to gather information to prevent, detect and prosecute offences against national security and to increase the capacity for the collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence. Loeppky confirmed that municipal and provincial police, CSIS and RCMP members participate in INSETs, but not US agencies. He said that each INSET has a CSIS officer.

There may be several project teams within an INSET, and the team’s internal chain of command reports to the Criminal Operations Officer at the divisional level, who arranges for any support (i.e. surveillance support) and also makes decisions about further “steps.” They also report to the NSOB in CID, for central coordination.

INSET teams are bound by RCMP policy, but the legally binding agreements for the A Division (Ottawa) are still being drafted and have not yet been signed, so regular RCMP policy is in effect. If, for example, a municipal officer committed a gross violation of policy, Loeppky said they would be disciplined by the home agency – the municipality.

INSET officers have access to the SCIS database, though there are certain components that are on a need-to-know basis only. Loeppky said municipal and provincial police officers joining an INSET are trained on information sharing. He said that US officers cannot access SCIS, however, an INSET officer, even those that came from municipal or provincial forces, could release information to US law enforcement or security intelligence agency as long as it complies with RCMP guidelines (i.e. complies with the Charter and is appropriate in terms of the Privacy Act). He said that no higher approval is needed, unless it’s a major investigation requiring coordination from CID (headquarters).

INSET officers are bound by RCMP policies, but not every violation of policy results in discipline. Loeppky explained that a minor violation wouldn’t result in discipline, although everything is determined on a case-by-case basis.

The RCMP’s Intelligence Cycle

Loeppky said that difference between "criminal intelligence" and "security intelligence" is that while the planning process is similar, the end result is different. He said that the end result of a security intelligence planning process, like with CSIS, is to inform the government.

In CSIS’ intelligence process, the first phase is government direction, but Loeppky said that in the RCMP’s intelligence process, the Criminal Operations (CROPS) Officers meet in June annually (and for a mid-year checkup) and establish national organized crime priorities. For national security matters, the CROPS officers are informed by the NSIB before they decide on resource allocations.

If an INSET officer wanted to investigate someone, it would go from the INSET officer to their INSET or NSIS commander, and ultimately to the CROPS officer. There is also a reporting relationship to headquarters (to get central coordination) and the Assistant Commissioner in Criminal Intelligence. The Assistant Commissioner is notified before starting a national security investigation looking at sensitive sectors (i.e. educational or religious institutions, the media, etc.), or when the media might become interested. A new policy (in effect as of Feb. 5, 2003) changed the reporting to immediately notify headquarters OIC National Security Investigation Branch.

Like CSIS’s targeting committee, Loeppky said that the RCMP has the Criminal Operations Officers on a committee that he chairs and that CID is involved in. He explained that they use a model evaluating certain characteristics of the groups/individuals they investigate to determine which are the highest risks.

Loeppky said that not every call to NSIS or an INSET unit would qualify as a major investigation, though they would all be documented on a case-by-case basis.

He said the second phase of the RCMP’s cycle is to look at what gaps in information exist and what is required before any tactical operations are possible.

Analysis (of national security investigations) is done by analysts within in the Criminal Analysis Branch or in the NSIB at headquarters, and uses corroborative information to support or refute intelligence to determine the larger picture. Loeppky explained that “collation” refers to the cross-referencing of information by fitting the pieces together to see that larger picture. A threat assessment brings together various pieces of information that may tell about a potential threat, and Loeppky said that those assessments are used to determine which threats require the most attention and resources.

He said that information disclosed from CSIS indicates an organization or individual has gone from being a concern to actual criminal activity. He said that a disclosure letter from CSIS provides background information that the RCMP analyses, whereas, an advisory letter from CSIS is more directly related to actual criminal activity.

"Reporting/Dissemination" is giving the analysis to the police officers who will implement the tactical plan addressing the issue.

Loeppky said that the creation of the headquarters Criminal Intelligence Directorate and the provincial criminal intelligence sections allows for various pieces of information to be brought together, put through the intelligence process (analysis and collation) and given to headquarters. He said that this gives a good picture of the “crime environment” in that province, allowing the resources to target those crimes, but also having a national picture which would allow you to focus on the highest threats to Canada.

The Intelligence Review Board (IRB) process reviews all finished intelligence assessments to ensure compliance with operational and administrative policy. Loeppky said he thinks it applies to both national security and organized criminal investigations, but he’s not sure.

The John Smith and Jim Jones Scenario (RCMP Policy)

Counsel proposed a hypothetical scenario: John Smith is the target of an investigation, and one day Jim Jones, who is engaging in lawful activity, talks with Smith. Counsel asked what happens to Jones, and Loeppky replied that the RCMP/INSET would try to determine if he’s uninvolved, a “low-level player” or a key person. He said an officer would enter Jones’ name into the SCIS database, and doesn’t need approval to do so.

Loeppky also said they would do some initial investigation to see if that “lead” was worth following, but if they didn’t find sufficient information, the investigation into Jones would end. However, Loeppky said Jones’ name would continue to be part of the file in SCIS. When counsel reiterated that Jones hasn’t engaged in unlawful activity, Loeppky said it could mean the RCMP just doesn’t know about any illegal activity and the information could become relevant later. He said that there are audit guidelines for how long Jones’ name might be in SCIS, but isn’t sure what they are.

Counsel asked if the RCMP would give US authorities information on Jones if they requested it. Loeppky replied that the information would be shared if there were reason to share it (i.e. an operational reason that could further an investigation) and if it were in compliance with the Privacy act. He admitted that no approval is needed as long as it complies with RCMP policies/guidelines.

Loeppky also said that information sharing often goes through liaison officers in Canada and in the US, and that the system wouldn’t work if they needed high level authorizations to share information on common targets. He said that virtually all organized crime investigations are cross-border.

Counsel asked if the information shared with the US about Jones is rated for reliability. Loeppky said yes, and explained that the classification ratings of “reliable”, “believed reliable”, “unknown reliability” and “doubtful reliability” relate to information from a source, but not information that came from police officer because that is acceptable as evidence. Handlers of the source place these classifications on the information. Loeppky said that if the information is deemed unreliable, it can be entered into the system as “unknown reliability.” He also confirmed that CSIS generally rates the reliability of its information, and that the RCMP would pass on that rating if they shared CSIS’ information with another agency.

The RCMP’s mandate/policy also says that it can collect criminal intelligence, not security intelligence. Loeppky said that the collection of Jones’ name and his meeting with Smith is criminal intelligence, not security intelligence, because they are investigating the target (Smith) for criminal activities. He said that similar situations occur often, with unknown people coming into and leaving investigations, never being examined again.

Counsel also asked twice, after noting RCMP policy (to not gather information on or investigate organizations engaged in lawful activities), if it would be improper for an RCMP officer to give information about Jones, who isn’t under investigation but was merely seen with a target, because it’s not criminal intelligence (Jones isn’t engaging in criminal activity). Loeppky said that the officer would have to apply appropriate judgement and put the information in the right context to ensure that the right message is shared, i.e. ”Jones is not a criminal” and there is no evidence of anything criminal. He said they would also have to give the context of how Jones’ name came to be in the file.

Counsel asked if that wasn’t still infringing on Jones’ rights because he’s not engaging in criminal activity, and Loeppky said “information sharing is the lifeblood of successful investigations, and pieces of information need to be put together and may ultimately result in putting that complete picture together about some activity….” Counsel repeated again that Jones is not a criminal, and the shared information might result in something happening to him. Loeppky insisted that the information is always shared in the proper context, and that the context must always be taken into consideration

When asked if an officer in Toronto would be aware of the US policy of extraordinary rendition in 2002, Loeppky said he only learned of it from news reports about Arar. Asked if a field officer should share information with an agency that he/she suspects will deport a Canadian to a foreign country, Loeppky replied that everything is determined on a case-by-case basis and that the officer must feel it is appropriate to share the information. He said the expectation is if an officer suspects that the rights of an individual will be violated, then he/she would be reluctant to share it. He then said they wouldn’t share it, especially if they knew it would be used for torture.

RCMP Policies and Ministerial Directives (read from RCMP documents)

National security investigations are the first priority, and all information about threats to national security must be entered in SCIS promptly.

The RCMP cannot investigate or gather information on organizations engaged in lawful activities. Another policy says that if some members of an organization are being investigated, that investigation will not automatically stretch to include the organization itself. However, yet another policy says that an organization engaged in lawful activities can be investigated if “allegation or intelligence justifies” it. Loeppky said that this change was made because activities that seem “innocuous” could later be found to be part of a criminal investigation. For example, he said that before 9/11 no one thought that learning to fly an airplane was harmful.

Loeppky explained that another new provision, the “sensitive sector”, was created because of community concerns about investigations into sensitive areas like religious and educational institutions or the media.

The Solicitor General's Directives are issued to the Commissioner of the RCMP, who incorporates the standards in the Directives in appropriate RCMP operational or administrative policies, Standing Orders or by other means. It is the Commissioner’s responsibility to ensure conformity to policy and that national security investigations are centrally coordinated at headquarters (Loeppky said that this directive is targeting prior inabilities to bring information together in order to stop events like 9/11).

Counsel noted that the date on the central coordination directive was the same as Arar’s news conference after his return from Syria (Nov. 4, 2003), and Loeppky replied that discussions over this directive had started about nine months before then. Counsel then noted that the policy includes directions for the Commissioner to notify the Minister of high profile or controversial cases, and Loeppky said it is meant to provide direction to government.

The Arrangements and Cooperation directive was also signed on Nov. 4, 2003, and calls for prior approval from the Minister, in consultation with Foreign Affairs and CSIS, before the RCMP enters into arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies (but it’s not needed for law enforcement agencies). Loeppky said that arrangements with law enforcement agencies are appropriate (nonetheless) because time may be critical and it is appropriate as long as everything is done according to policy. However, the RCMP cannot release information to a foreign agency if it is against any Canadian laws.

Another directive says the RCMP must keep records of every oral and written arrangement with a foreign intelligence agency and report it to the Minister. Loeppky says they provide an annual report to the Minister, and that this directive only applies to new arrangements and not those made before this directive was created (he said there are few). However, he then said that they will report on arrangements that existed before.

CSIS is considered the lead agency with foreign intelligence agencies, and the RCMP must notify CSIS of any exchanges of information. Loepkky said this directive addresses the “rare” circumstance of the RCMP not being able to share information with CSIS.

Loeppky also clarified that CSIS would be notified if a foreign security intelligence agency gave information to the RCMP. However, he said that information about a criminal event is something that the RCMP responds to. He said this also qualifies as a contact, not an ongoing arrangement. The initial arrangement requires approval, but each contact does not.

Loeppky also said that not all organizations will enter into written agreements, and that all oral agreements are reported on. He admitted that most of the RCMP’s arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies are oral, but said they have few dealings with such organizations.

He also confirmed that most of the arrangements with foreign law enforcement are oral as well, saying it is often just one officer to another, working in similar or connected cases, and that it’s impractical otherwise.

Counsel stated that he thought the directives meant that RCMP agreements must be in writing and that there must be an inventory or record of these agreements. Loeppky explained that this directive isn’t focused on the day-to-day sharing of information, but on agreements binding the Government of Canada to an obligation. Counsel asked if this meant that any kind of arrangement, i.e. with a US law enforcement agency, could just be oral and on a day-to-day basis you could have a US officer phoning an RCMP officer asking for information. Loeppky replied that an officer would consider all the necessary things before making a judgement. He also said that there are checks and balances, like audits and supervisors. Counsel asked if this included sharing security intelligence, and Loeppky said it is CSIS’ role to exchange security intelligence with foreign security agencies.

Counsel noted that another policy seems to say that agreements of a commitment with another party to provide or receive services or assistance or to engage in joint activities must be in writing. Loeppky said this refers to “technical sharing arrangements,” which must be written.

Counsel asked if a Tahitian official could call an INSET officer out of the blue asking for information, and Loeppky replied that most international sharing goes through Interpol and that a direct request from a Tahitian officer would not occur.

Another policy says that the RCMP will not become involved in the violation of human rights unless the involvement complies with international conventions. The policy also says that disclosure with a country that violates human rights can be considered if it’s justified for Canada’s security or enforcement interests, if it can be controlled by applying conditions and if it doesn’t have a negative human rights connotation. Loeppky said that in these circumstances they would be reluctant to share any information, but that extreme circumstances might require it. Loeppky then agreed that the policy says an RCMP officer shouldn’t give any information to a foreign agency if they suspect a Canadian's rights may be violated.

Counsel asked if information was given and the RCMP officer subsequently learned it was used to violate a Canadian’s rights, what should the officer do? Loeppky replied, after being asked twice, that he expects the officer would have taken precautions and care to ensure that wouldn’t happen, such as passing the information through Foreign Affairs or other “venues that would mitigate that.” Asked a third time, Loeppky replied that it wouldn’t be a frontline officer making such a decision, and that it would be reviewed by supervisors and be analysed to minimize any risks. Asked a fourth time, with the clarification that these risk assessments were done beforehand, Loeppky said “the obligation of Canada and the RCMP is certainly to … register our concern and our protest.”

Further testimony and cross-examination by counsel for Maher Arar continued on July 6 and will be posted shortly.